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Case 11: The Bottom Line and the Seminary
Asbjorn Osland
San Jose State University
Mark Ankeny
Westminster College
Challenges for the New Seminary Dean
Dr. Gary Janzen, the new seminary dean, had recently come to
Friends’ Northwest University (hereafter referred to as Friends’).
He was to develop a strategy to make the seminary competitive
locally (with its master’s degrees, certificate programs, and outreach),
and competitive nationally (with its doctor of ministry degree program,
which was based on a hybrid residential and online format). Janzen
had a practical orientation, having served more than 25 years as a
pastor. His terminal degree was a doctor of ministry – a professionally
oriented doctorate, as opposed to the Ph.D.s held by researchers in
seminaries. The newly arrived President Bill Duncan believed the
seminary needed a practical leader.
During the first three months of his tenure as the dean of
the seminary, Janzen interviewed as many people as possible.
The seminary had never even come close to breaking even;
the financial reports showed yearly deficits of $150,000 to $300,000.
The faculty morale of the seminary was extremely low; they felt
beaten down, misunderstood, betrayed, assaulted, and unappreciated
by the merger between the seminary and Friends’. When the two
cultures had merged, the university culture had been imposed on the
seminary. The seminary faculty had not had fair or good representation
among the key administrators or board at the university level; there
was no one who “championed” their cause, accomplishments, or
mission. There was no clear identity or defined constituency. Janzen
knew he had to act fast. He was concerned that President Duncan
would be forced to pull the plug on the seminary; long-term deficits
were unsustainable in the tuition-driven university. Although the
M.B.A., counseling, and graduate degree programs in education
subsidized the undergraduate program, Duncan and the university
board wanted the other graduate programs (i.e., seminary and Psy.D.)
to at least break even. He had instructed Janzen to resolve the financial
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deficit and had told him he would support him if he could come up with
a good plan.
A central feature to Janzen’s plan was expanding the doctor of
ministry options to include a program he and the faculty named
“Leadership in Emerging Culture” (LEC). The American public had
been moving away from established mainstream Protestant
denominations to non-denominational churches or away from
Christianity all together. Janzen and the faculty felt a strong sense of
mission in attempting to be responsive to the spiritual needs of the
changing American society. One way to do so was to train leaders in
adapting Christ’s message of love and compassion to the needs of the
emerging culture. Janzen was editing the LEC draft proposal to be
presented to the faculty. Excerpts read as follows:
• The LEC Doctor of Ministry (D.Min.) track “seeks to enable
students to effectively lead in the emerging culture. Students in the
program: establish a conceptual basis for ‘leadership in the emerging
culture,’ develop their ministry vision and ‘voice’ in effective
leadership, explore how one’s identification with the person of Christ
impacts one’s self-perception as a leader, engage in and reflect on a
cross-cultural experience in order to ‘think globally and act locally’
with regard to leadership issues in their particular ministry contexts,
reflect on the essential intermingling of leadership and spiritual
formation in corporate Christian contexts, and synthesize a coherent
theology of leadership in the emerging culture that will serve to inform
their practice of leadership.”
• “The customized courses are designed to give students greater
flexibility to pursue subjects of interest to them.”
• The celebrity theologian’s “courses are characterized by directed
reading and self-organizing interaction. … students explore various
aspects of leadership in the emerging culture.” Courses normally
include the reading, meeting weekly in an asynchronous chat forum
to discuss the assigned course materials, and meeting once a week for
synchronous chat. The celebrity theologian facilitates the discussion.
Students meet from time to time with the celebrity theologian.
This would be a new D.Min. track that would be responsive to
changing societal needs. Janzen knew that pastors were searching for
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professional, cognitive, psychological, and spiritual renewal, and some
sought to meet these needs in the D.Min. certification. Some professors
from other departments were skeptical of the celebrity appeal that was
central to the new degree. The celebrity theologian was to be the lead
mentor to the students in the program. Should Janzen go forward with
this program even though he knew its dependence on one celebrity
made it fragile? The existing D.Min. program was more traditional and
didn’t bring in enough revenues to keep the seminary in the black. He
had to be careful with the faculty in that some might view the celebrity
theologian as a tacky way to make the seminary more attractive.
Friends’ At a Glance
Friends’ had been founded in 1891. It conferred the following
degrees: B.A., B.S., M.A., M.A.T., M.B.A., M.Div., M.Ed., D.Min.,
Ed.D., and Psy.D. It offered majors in more than 35 undergraduate
majors. It had a 77-acre suburban campus (20 miles from downtown)
and other sites, the most important of which was the park-like
metropolitan office building that housed the seminary as well as
evening adult programs in degree completion, counseling, education,
and business. Friends’ had 134 full-time faculty.
Friends’ was based on evangelical Christianity. As a university,
it was “to demonstrate the meaning of Jesus Christ by offering a caring
educational community in which each individual may achieve the
highest intellectual and personal growth and by participating
responsibly in our world’s concerns” (from university Web site).
Friends’ was to “liberate the student for a life of purpose and
fulfillment …”. It maintains a “program of varied activities that directs
the student to a commitment to Christ as Lord and Savior, encourages
attitudes of reverence and devotion toward God, leads to recognition
that the revealed commandments of God are the supreme criteria of the
good life, enables the student to mirror the example of Christ in human
relationships, and develops a greater desire to serve humanity in a spirit
of Christian love.” It promotes activities that emphasize “the
development of leadership, initiative, and teamwork by giving
opportunity to make practical use of the skills and ideas acquired
through academic courses.” Friends’ mission includes a concern for
social justice, a commitment to peace and nonviolence, and a belief in
the equality of all people.
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Though the school was founded by the Friends, only approximately
nine percent of the undergraduate students are Friends. More than 50
denominations are represented on campus, and the largest
denominational choice is Baptist; however, “non-denominational”
was the category chosen by the largest number of students. Friends’
is a Christian community that expects students and employees to abide
by the university’s community responsibilities and expectations.
All employees – faculty, administration, and staff – are committed
evangelical Christians. The students do not have to be Christian, though
the vast majority of the traditional undergraduates are. However, many
The graduate programs were of the adults in evening
programs are not. Schools of
used to subsidize the under- divinity in universities can
graduate program that had
have people of various faiths,
become non-viable financially. including non-Christians, but
this was not true at Friends’.
Transition from College to University
The seminary was merged with Friends’ during the period when
Friends’ made a transition from college to university status. The
graduate programs were used to subsidize the undergraduate program
that had become non-viable financially. Graduate programs were
expected to contribute to the undergraduate deficit or at least break
even. The seminary had not made money in recent years, but it was
Janzen’s hope that the LEC program would push it out of the red.
In 1983, Friends’ had 650 traditional undergraduate students and a
budget of $5.3 million. To survive financially, the university had moved
into adult and graduate programs (e.g., degree completion for working
adults, 1986; doctor of psychology, 1990; master of arts in teaching,
1992; master of business administration, 1993; master of education,
1993; Evangelical Seminary, 1996). The M.B.A., counseling, and
graduate education programs continued to generate large surpluses
that subsidized the undergraduate college.
However, the growth in graduate programs coincided with a
nearly 100% increase in the undergraduate student population in the
undergraduate college. The college had been written up in news
magazines as a top ranked regional school. Christian parents saw
Friends’ as a safe haven for their children that also provided what
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they perceived as an excellent education. In order to enhance the
administrative and marketing capacity of the university and better
serve students, many administrators had been added in marketing,
recruitment, and retention efforts, thereby driving administrative costs
higher. Though the undergraduate college charged premium tuition
prices, it still could not make ends meet. It also used financial aid to
attract students; it didn’t really collect the premium tuition prices from
most families, who had average annual incomes under $50,000.
Other liberal arts colleges depended on income from endowments to
subsidize their undergrad programs. Friends’ endowment was modest;
for 2002-2003 it was $15,086,540, only enough to cover four to five
months of the operating budget. As Bill Duncan, the current president,
was fond of stating, “We live by our wits.” Friends’ had to be
entrepreneurial and responsive to its market segments and it could not
sustain autonomous programs, such as the seminary, that ran perennial
deficits.
Undergraduate majors varied in terms of profitability, but Duncan
saw the undergraduate college as a unit made up of interdependent
majors that had to be seen holistically. One couldn’t readily eliminate
expensive majors, such as science or engineering, without decreasing
the overall image of the undergraduate college. Eliminating the seminary
would not threaten the institutional identity or existence of the university,
as it was not perceived as central to the university. The Christian core
was the undergraduate program. Although the seminary clearly
contributed to the Christian mission of the university, it was evaluated
first on its bottom line because it was a graduate program; this was the
way Friends’ key administrators and board perceived the matter.
Seminary’s Financial Problems Led To Merger with Friends’
The financial difficulties of the seminary preceded Janzen’s arrival.
It had nearly closed earlier.
The seminary had always been multi-denominational. It was
founded in 1947 by the Evangelicals, Quakers (synonymous with
Friends), and Free Methodists. It was the first in the region to achieve
dual accreditation by the Association of Theological Schools (1974) and
the regional association of schools and colleges (1976).
The key factors leading up to the merger were the desire of Friends’
to become a university, which required graduate programs such as those
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offered by the seminary, and the financial desperation of the seminary.
L. Samuel Davidson, the president of Evangelical Seminary at the time
of the merger, was the key facilitator. He had also served as president of
Friends’ years before, thereby making him familiar with all the key
decision-makers.
Davidson came to the seminary on January 2, 1993 with the goal of
getting the seminary ready to merge with a larger institution. From his
earlier contacts with the seminary, he was aware of significant financial
problems. Yet, upon arrival, he was shocked to find that the seminary
couldn’t even afford to have its garbage removed. The next day bank
officials demanded immediate payment on a note that was one year in
arrears. After investigating further, he discovered that the seminary was
$2.4 million in debt. This debt and the dwindling support from its
traditional evangelical constituency threatened accreditation from the
Association of Theological Schools and the regional collegiate
accreditation body. He struggled to keep the seminary afloat through
donations, tuition revenues, and grants. He finally managed to make the
seminary attractive to Friends’.
Friends’ board and key administrators thought the addition of a
seminary would justify Friends’ transition from college to university
status. At a joint meeting of the boards in February 1996, the decision to
merge on July 1, 1996 was made. This gave the administrators very
little time to work out all the details. Thus, a college of approximately
2,000 students absorbed the 300-student seminary and renamed itself a
university.
The merger process was not easy, but Friends’ balance sheet
improved (see Table 1). The contribution of assets at the time of the
merger made the decision to merge a “no-brainer” in the eyes of the
CPA accounting and finance professor who had an extensive outside
practice and was experienced at business valuation. The accredited
seminary programs were worth a great deal as well even though they
didn’t figure in the balance sheet. The most visible asset of the seminary
was its building, which proved ideal for evening adult programs
servicing the metropolitan area and beyond.
Post-Merger Era under Dean Janzen
Janzen knew he had to address both the external community to build
interest in seminary programs as well as maintain positive relations with
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Table 1
Summary of Impact of Merger on Friends’ (July 1, 1996)

Pre-Merger
Friends’

Pre-Merger
Seminary

Post-Merger
Friends’

Assets

$43,289,181

$7,771,899

$51,061,080

Liabilities

$11,844,766

$4,048,683

$15,893,459

Net Assets

$31,444,405

$3,723,216

$35,167,621

Friends’ administrators so they wouldn’t be too draconian in their
demands that the seminary always cover its expenses. He knew he had
to get the seminary close to breaking even but he also could promote
several features of the seminary to the university administration:
• The seminary had a stronger minority enrollment than other parts
of the university. The undergraduate program was based in a small
town, 25 miles from the greater metropolitan area, which was not
perceived as attractive for African-American students.
• The Mexican-Americans who lived close to the rural campus often
chose not to attend higher education. Hence, the undergraduate college
was overwhelmingly white. This was a concern for the board of
directors, which had directed the Friends’ administrators to work on
increasing minority enrollment.
• The seminary also led the university in the adoption of Web-based
teaching and the use of smart classrooms. Such classrooms had built-in
computers, overhead projection devices, and ceiling-mounted
projectors. The system developed by the seminary became a model for
Friends’ new construction at the undergraduate campus.
• Janzen had started a guest lecture series to serve local churches by
bringing in famous speakers. The first several events were very well
attended.
Janzen wanted to be innovative as well as maintain the existing
successful programs. He thought a positive attribute of the LEC
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program was its celebrity appeal in that a charismatic theologian was to
be contracted to give some of the courses and serve as lead online
mentor to the students. He also knew that this dependence on one
celebrity would be perceived as a weakness in that the program could
be done irreparable harm should the celebrity theologian become
unavailable to Friends’ due to illness or a falling out between the
university and the celebrity theologian.
Traditional Protestant denomination churches suffer poor
attendance. On the other hand, megachurches are popular because of
charismatic leadership and programs that address the psychological,
spiritual, and social support needs of congregants. These churches are
referred to as spirit-filled. They are vibrant and exciting as opposed to
the reserved reverence of traditional church. They offer a wide range of
programs to serve people, including small groups that give people a
feeling of social support, entertaining worship meetings that include
professional musicians, and so forth. Janzen thought the seminary
would have to be responsive to this movement toward spirit-filled
communities of faith such as the megachurches. He knew the seminary
could not count on ties to a specific denomination like many other
seminaries that trained pastors for that denomination. The Friends didn’t
require that their pastors have a master of divinity, though many of
those serving programmed meetings (i.e., services led by pastors that
appeared much like other Protestant worship services) had formal
divinity training. Unprogrammed Friends meetings did not depend on
pastoral leadership. Furthermore, some of the non-denominational
groups in the area did not require formal training for their pastors.
Janzen knew he could not count on denominational support. He hoped
programs like the LEC would alleviate the financial deficits of the
seminary.
Managing the Tension between Mission and the Bottom Line
During the ’90s growth years, a campus culture had developed at
Friends’ whereby financial concerns drove the evaluation of new
programs. Mission-driven programs typically didn’t get beyond faculty
review unless they could show self-sufficiency within a three-year
period. President Duncan appreciated this concern for fiscal discipline.
He had worked at four other small Christian colleges before coming to
Friends’ and viewed the opportunity at Friends’ as his last chance to
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serve as a university president before retirement. He was familiar with
the competitive landscape of Christian undergraduate education.
Duncan was concerned about the seminary’s competition in that it
competed with another seminary that was also losing money. However,
the other seminary had a wealthy donor who enabled it to continue and
even to expand; it had opened a branch in northern California.
The transition from an undergraduate college (focused exclusively
on Christian education) to a larger institution with elements that were
clearly “profit” centers (i.e., excess revenues in not-for-profit
accounting), such as the early degree completion program (it had begun
struggling financially of late), counseling, and graduate business and
education, created strains on the existing structure. For example,
Friends’ administrators and board continued to be focused on
undergraduate education in their meetings yet understood that the
graduate programs existed and were bringing in money, nearly 30% of
the total (see Table 2).
This transition to a complex university occurred over more than a
decade, beginning in 1986. The organizational structure changed, the
accounting and administrative systems expanded, enrollment grew
dramatically, and so forth. However, the mission and strategy of the
organization did not change from the prior emphasis on undergraduate
Christian education.
Table 2
Undergraduate and Graduate Revenues
Academic Year

Program

Total

Percentage

FY 02-03

Undergrad

$25,978,391

71%

Actual Grad

$10,558,623

29%

Total

$36,537,014

Undergrad

$28,512,752

72%

Actual Grad

$11,255,127

28%

Total

$39,767,879

FY 03-04
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Should Janzen Push for the Adoption of the LEC Program?
Janzen knew the seminary’s accomplishments were extensive.
However, Janzen also understood he had to bring the seminary’s
finances close to balance. The seminary needed a cash cow quickly.
It could not charge more and attract students in the master’s programs.
Should the seminary expand its existing doctor of ministry program
(D.Min.) to include an LEC track? What Janzen and the seminary
faculty were looking into was a D.Min. track focused on serving the
needs of what they called “emerging culture,” a Postmodern culture
less defined by traditional denominations. In the Postmodern era, the
“emerging culture” longed for a spirit-filled church that would meet
their religious, psychological, and social support needs.
Janzen understood that the board and administrators were focused
on the undergraduate college, which could run deficits. He accepted that
the seminary, which also served the Christian mission, would need to
come close to breaking even and could not continue to run large deficits.
Janzen also was concerned about the sense of mission felt by the
faculty. How could he get them to see beyond meeting budget targets;
satisfying teaching loads; surviving the retention, tenure, and promotion
process; and other such practical details? He knew that theologians had
spent their careers studying the Christian worldview, which is
transcendent, going beyond life’s more banal activities. Such people are
responsive to the notion that they are part of a cause, an evangelical
movement. Janzen thought the LEC program would build excitement
which would protect them from being preoccupied with their routines so
that they could be motivated by the transcendent. He was concerned that
faculty had become too comfortable teaching, writing, and serving on
committees – too inward-looking. He wanted to promote outreach and
continuing education seminars to promote the seminary. He thought the
LEC program would complement the outreach approach.
Janzen worried that the seminary faculty too readily indulged
themselves in self-pity about the merger. He thought success with the
LEC program would help them put this behind them. Janzen felt like
telling the faculty to “get over it,” but he hadn’t experienced the
messiness of the merger. He knew that he had to help build excitement,
which he thought might be possible through the LEC program. Also, he
worried that the administration would keep harping at the seminary and
making veiled closure threats if the deficits weren’t corrected.
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He had to present the seminary in a positive light to university
administrators to influence their perceptions. He hoped the LEC
program would help administrators focus on what the seminary was
doing to promote the mission of the university rather than continually
be preoccupied with losses.
Janzen reflected on how the LEC program would mirror the
university’s values. It was to demonstrate the meaning of Jesus Christ
by offering a learning community that would participate responsibly in
the world’s concerns. He saw it as providing pastors a chance to renew
themselves for a life of purpose and fulfillment to serve humanity in a
spirit of Christian love. Central to the program was the development of
leadership, initiative, and teamwork by giving opportunity to make
practical use of the skills and ideas acquired through the LEC program.
Janzen understood how such leaders would more likely find a home in
the non-denominational and evangelical churches, rather than the staid
and dying churches linked to conventional Protestant denominations.
Janzen felt a sense of urgency about ministering to the needs of people
who couldn’t find a home in the conventional churches. He thought the
path revealed to him through his analysis and prayers was the LEC
program.
He wondered how he could present the LEC program to the faculty
and the administration so that they would approve it. He couldn’t rely
exclusively on the Christian focus of the seminary and its programs as
the administrators applied a different standard (i.e., the bottom line) to
the seminary than the undergraduate college, which lost a great deal of
money each year. How could he present the seminary in a positive light
in terms of its contributions and show how the LEC program would
build on what he perceived as a positive path? Would it resolve the
financial bottom line problem of the seminary?
Janzen also knew President Duncan was concerned about whether
or not to pull the plug on the seminary. President Duncan had said
publicly that he thought there was not enough demand in the area for
two seminaries; he saw the competitive landscape as unpromising.
Janzen was hoping the national draw of the proposed LEC program
would reframe this argument of too many seminaries for the area from
a local frame to a national one.
It was unlikely that the program would foster much in terms of loss
as existing faculty were used and the celebrity theologian’s contract
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could be made contingent on satisfactory enrollment or cancelled after
the first year.
Duncan was willing to support the new program; he didn’t think it
could do any harm to the university’s image in that it was perceived
locally as an entrepreneurial university. The university would
periodically borrow money against its endowment. It had done so
previously with the failed launch of its online effort and lost hundreds
of thousands of dollars. To Duncan it came down to the following: risk
a few hundred thousand dollars to launch the LEC program or close the
seminary. Duncan had been through enough start-up programs to know
that early budgets were simply estimates. He thought several hundred
thousand dollars was a likely short-term cost before the program began
to pay off.
It was late and Janzen had to prepare his Powerpoint presentation
for the full faculty. How should he present the LEC program to get
buy-in from faculty and administrators?
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